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COMMENTS
the nature of the duty, amount of damages recoverable, assign-
ability and seizure of the insured's cause of action. Ideally, law
should be administered in a predictable manner providing cer-
tainty and stability. Louisiana courts need not become en-
meshed in meaningless distinctions and nebulous standards when
the Civil Code clearly provides a legal remedy for the insured
who is adversely affected by an insurer's refusal to compromise
a claim.
Katherine L. Shaw
HEARSAY, THE CONFRONTATION GUARANTEE
AND RELATED PROBLEMS
The hearsay rule excludes out of court assertions offered
to prove the matter asserted' because they are not made under
oath and their veracity cannot be tested by cross examination.2
Of course, there are many exceptions to the rule based on the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and necessity.8
The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to confront
the witnesses against him. . . ." Presumably, the ratification
of the sixth amendment in 1789 did not crystallize into immu-
table form the rules concerning admission of hearsay in criminal
1. The definition used is essentially that found in Comment, Hearsay
and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. Rsv.
611 (1954). Wigmore does not attempt to define hearsay in his treatise on
evidence. 5 J. WIGMORE, EV[DENCE §§ 1360-1366 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited WOMORE]. McCormick offers a slightly different definition from the
one used in this Comment. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954) [hereinafter
cited MCCORMICK], but warns that not too much should be expected from
any definition. The word "assertion" is used instead of statement to em-
phasize that hearsay may be non verbal. McCoRMiCK § 229.
2. As McCormick points out, the absence of an oath and lack of
opportunity to cross examine are frequently mentioned together as justi-
fications for the hearsay rule. MCCORMICK § 224 n.5. A third reason, perhaps
implicit in the first two, frequently given Is that the trier of fact has no
chance to observe the demeanor of the declarant if hearsay evidence is
used. Generally it is agreed that the absence of an opportunity to cross
examine the declarant is the principle justification for the rule against
hearsay. MCCORMICK § 2241; WIMORE § 1365; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REv. 177 (1948).
For an examination of spurious reasons sometimes advanced to justify
the rule, see WIGMORE § 1363.
3. MCCORMICK §§ 230-299; WIGMORE §§ 1420-1684.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. With the exception of Idaho every state con-
stitution has a similar provision. WIGMORE § 1397 n.1.
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trials,5 and the clause has never been interpreted literally to
require actual face-to-face confrontation of all witnesses.6 It is
generally accepted that the essential element of the confronta-
tion guarantee is cross examination,7 and since cross examina-
tion has been a traditional common law right subject to certain
exceptions, the confrontation guarantee is likewise subject to
the same exceptions.8 Wigmore contemplated that the establish-
ment of appropriate new exceptions was permissible. In fact,
he considered the confrontation clause to be merely a bar to
total abolition by the legislature of the right of cross exam-
ination.9 The broad freedom, implied by Wigmore, of the courts
and legislature to alter the hearsay rule in criminal cases is
questionable in view of a line of Supreme Court decisions based
on confrontation beginning with Pointer v. Texas.10 Moreover it
seems possible that the confrontation guarantee may give rise
to a constitutional exclusionary rule which, although related
to the hearsay rule, is based on somewhat different principles.1
In Pointer the transcript of an absent witness' testimony
which had been taken at a preliminary hearing was introduced
as evidence at petitioner's robbery trial. Petitioner did not have
counsel at the preliminary hearing. The Court reasoned that
the absence of counsel denied the petitioner an opportunity
to cross examine the witness effectively. The defendant's right
of confrontation which in this decision was held obligatory on
5. In Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1932),
the Court said: "The judiciary clause of the Constitution . . . did not
crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only possible
means for presenting a case or controversy otherwise cognizable by the
federal courts." The same appears to be true of the hearsay rule and the
confrontation clause.
6. WIGMORB § 1397.
7. Id. See also Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542 (1926); Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325
(1911); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Kirby v. United States,
174- U.S. 41 (1898); Mattox v. United States, 156, 237 (1895); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 160 (1878).
8. Bee Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 41 (1898); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237 (1895).
What is apparently the only authoritative history of the sixth amend-
ment agrees with Wigmore that the purpose of the clause was to preserve
the opportunity to cross examine the witness. F. HELLER, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT 104 (1951).
9. WiumoRE 9 1397.
10. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
11. Comment, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach
to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1965). This




the states by the fourteenth amendment1 2 had been thereby
violated, and hence his conviction was reversed. Justice Black
writing for the majority commented, "[T]his Court has recog-
nized the admissibility against an accused of dying declarations
and of testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a
former trial. Nothing we hold here is to the contrary."' s The
opinion goes on to say that there may be other analogous situa-
tions which do not fall within the "scope of the constitutional
rule requiring confrontation of witnesses. 1 4 Of course, dying
declarations and prior testimony are both well-recognized ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule,'1 5 and being grounded upon guaran-
tees of truthworthiness and necessity, are analogous to most
other exceptions.' 6 Thus, the decision gingerly but undeniably
suggested that some exceptions to the hearsay rule might run
afoul of the confrontation clause. While no subsequent Supreme
Court case has held that an exception violated the right of
confrontation, in several cases it has apparently recognized that
hearsay problems are to an extent constitutional problems.'1
The most important of these are Douglas v. Alabama' and
Bruton v. United States.'9
In Douglas, which was decided the same day as Pointer,
12. Apparently the federal standards of confrontation, whatever they
may be, were made binding on the states by Pointer, since virtually every
state constitution has its own confrontation clause. See note 4 supra.
13. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) [citations omitted].
14. Id.
15. MCCORMICK H 230-238, 258-264; WIGMORE §§ 1430-1452. Although Wig-
more does not treat prior testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule,
most courts and commentators do consider it an exception. MCCORMICK
§ 230.
16. Dying declarations have traditionally been characterized as trust-
worthy. The need for the evidence is quite obvious. MCCORMICK H9 258-264;
WIGMOR10 §§ 1431-1443.
The necessity element for prior testimony is generally satisfied by the
requirement that the witness be unavailable although not necessarily
deceased as the Pointer decision suggested. Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have to an extent clarified the unavailability requirement. See
text at note 25 infra. The trustworthiness factor is satisfied by the prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See Comment, Federal Con-
frontation: A Not Very Clear Bay On Hearsay, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 366,
373 (1966).
17. In addition to Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) and Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), see Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250 (1969); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1968); Roberts v. Russell,
392 U.S. 293 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Parker v. Gladden,
385 U.S. 363 (1966); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1965). See also Smith
v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
18. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
19. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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the prosecutor had put the defendant's alleged accomplice on
the stand. Under the guise of refreshing that witness' memory
the prosecuting attorney read aloud the accomplice's entire
confession inserting occasional questions. The confession itself
which was incriminating to the defendant was inadmissible
hearsay. The reading of the confession by the prosecutor was
not testimony and, therefore, was not violative of the hearsay
rule. The Court, looking behind that technicality, reasoned that
the substance of testimony which could not possibly be cross
examined had been placed before the jury, and reversed the
petitioner's conviction on confrontation grounds.
Bruton is a very similar case. There a co-defendant's con-
fession which implicated Bruton was admitted into evidence at
trial. Because the confession was inadmissible hearsay as to
Bruton, the jury was instructed to consider it evidence only
against the co-defendant. The Supreme Court reversed Bruton's
conviction finding there was substantial risk that the jury had
not been able to follow the instruction, thereby depriving peti-
tioner of his right of confrontation.20
It seems clear that the purpose of Pointer and the sub-
sequent confrontation decisions was not to exclude all hearsay
from criminal trials. Nothing in Pointer necessarily implies any
essential conflict between the right of confrontation and the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as a whole.2 1 Moreover, no
subsequent case, state or federal, has condemned a hearsay
exception in its entirety as being unconstitutional. Beyond this,
little can be said about confrontation with any degree of cer-
tainty. Why the Court has departed from the traditional view
of confrontation is by no means clear. It has been suggested
that Pointer merely amounts to an effort to supplement the
criminal defendant's right to counsel, 22 and that Douglas can
be explained in terms of improper prosecution tactics.2 3
At least one writer suggests that the Court has attempted
to use confrontation to effect a standardization of the hearsay
20. The rule in Bruton was held. binding on the states in Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
21. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE O THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 156 (1969) [hereinafter cited
PROPOSED RULES].
22. Id.; Comment, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 366 (1966). See also Note, 4
DUQUESNE L. REV. 165 (1966); Note, 3 HOUSTON L. REV. 244 (1965).
23. PROPOSED RULES 156.
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rule throughout the states in criminal trials.24 Certainly, to an
extent Pointer and its progeny seem to reflect the Supreme
Court's disapproval of the manner in which hearsay problems
have been handled locally.25 Obviously the federal constitutional
right of confrontation could insure to criminal defendants mini-
mum standards of treatment in the hearsay area. However, this
standardization suggestion implies that the policy considera-
tions involved in the confrontation cases are basically the same
as those underlying the exceptions to the hearsay rule. In other
words, the right to confrontation would be satisfied if the out
of court statement were trustworthy and necessary. Thus the
confrontation right should require the application of a gen-
eralized hearsay standard balancing in a constitutional perspec-
tive, probative value against necessity.26 The suggestion is a
sensible one which avoids the ritualistic approach inherent in
the traditional hearsay exceptions and it is in line with modern
proposals to streamline the hearsay operation.2 T Nonetheless,
reliability and need probably are not in themselves determi-
native of the right of confrontation. Certainly it is even irrele-
vant to speak in terms of reliability where the out-of-court
statement is offered nonassertively. 28 Moreover, the right to
confront the "witness connotes an active participation by the
defendant with the witness .... -29 This notion of face to face
participation with the witness seems to be implicit in a few
of the cases. 0 For instance, in light of Douglas and Bruton
24. Comment, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 366 (1966). See also Notes, 30 ALBANY L.
REv. 151 (1966), 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 500 (1966).
25. Comment, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 366 (1966).
26. Id. The comment suggests there were three possible theories behind
Pointer and Douglas: (1) Confrontation was used in Pointer to merely
supplement the right to counsel. (2) Pointer is only one more step towards
the entire incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. (3) The Confrontation guarantee was used in
Pointer and Douglas to effectuate a standardization of the hearsay opera-
tion throughout the states. The latter is clearly favored by the comment.
27. E.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503; PROPOSED RULES Rule 8-04(a);
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 64(4)(c), 45.
28. Comment, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 366 (1966).
29. Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 743 (1965).
30. State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 (1967),. is a partic-
ularly good illustration. There defendant was convicted of rape. At his trial
a certificate entitled "Report for Examination for Alleged Rape" was
admitted over objection. The physican who made the report did not appear
at trial. The court found that the use of the document denied the defendant
his right of confrontation because the physician In effect testified without
being subject to cross examination. That is of course true whenever hearsay
evidence is received. The point seems to be that regardless of the trust-
worthiness of the document its use in a rape trial should not be tolerated.
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it is safe to say that the admission of a confession other than
the defendant's own constitutes a denial of the right to con-
frontation. That result seemingly would not, and certainly
should not, depend upon the circumstantial probability that the
confession is reliable.8' If these suppositions are correct, then
the confrontation clause guarantees that some out of court
testimony cannot be used against a criminal defendant not-
withstanding the trustworthiness and necessity of the evidence.82
In any case, the Supreme Court by requiring a more stringent
exclusionary principle for evidence offered against a criminal
defendant is running counter to much modern authority which
would allow greater use of hearsay evidence and would depend
on the trier of fact to evaluate the probative value of the
evidence.38
Because the sanctions of the confrontation requirement are
as drastic84 as its substance is vague the lower courts face
difficult problems in dealing with hearsay in criminal cases.
The remainder of this article is devoted to an examination of
decisions dealing with confrontation in various contexts.
Prior Inconsistent Statements
The credibility of a witness may be impeached by introduc-
ing his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present
testimony. 5 A prior inconsistent statement is not an exception
to the hearsay rule because the statement is offered for a non-
assertive use and hence for the purposes of the rule is not con-
sidered hearsay. 6 The use of prior inconsistent statements
places in evidence testimony not subject to cross examination
Bee also United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa.
1963). But see United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1968); Kay v.
United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
31. The guarantee of reliability primarily insures the sincerity of the
out of court statement. It does not protect against defects in the memory
or perception of the declarant as presumably does cross examination.
E. MORGAN, MODEL CODE OF EviDNcE-Foreword, 36-50 (1942). Comment, 75
YALE L.J. 1434 (1966). Possibly federal confrontation protects against these
dangers as well. See generally Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Applica-
tion of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. Rsv. 177 (1948).
32. Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1965).
33. See note 26 supra; see also McCoRmIcK § 305.
34. Where defendant's right of confrontation has been violated, apparently
he must be given a new trial, unless the violation amounts to harmless
error. See cases cited note 17 supra. On harmless error, see Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966).
35. McCoRMICK §§ 33-50; WIMORE §§ 1017-1046.
36. See note 35 supra.
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and devoid of any guarantee of trustworthiness. Generally cer-
tain traditional safeguards attend the admission of prior state-
ments. The statement must be actually inconsistent with the
witness's testimony, it may not relate to collateral matters,8 7
and the witness must be given an opportunity to explain or
deny.88 Finally, in virtually all jurisdictions the prior statement
may not be used for its substantive value and a party may have
the jury given instructions to that effect.89 In Louisiana if the
statement relates to the question of guilt or innocence the
instruction must be given at the time the statement is offered
whether requested or not.40 Furthermore, McCormick contends
that a prior statement may not be admitted where it is the only
evidence of a material fact.4 1
The rule that prior inconsistent statements may not be used
substantively has been criticized.4 2 The witness who made the
statement is, of course, on the stand and many authorities con-
sider the opportunity to examine that witness adequate protec-
tion for the defendant. 48 Moreover, it is doubtful that a jury
can follow an instruction which requires it to ignore the
assertive content of a statement.44 However, if the impeaching
statement is offered by the prosecution against a defense wit-
ness, the defendant may not have an opportunity to cross
examine the witness but will be limited to a redirect exam-
ination.4 Without the opportunity to ask leading questions the
examination into the prior statement may prove frustrating.4 6
Of course, where the prosecution has been permitted to impeach
its own witness the defendant does have an opportunity to cross
examine that witness.47
37. See note 35 supra.
38. See note 35 supra. This is known as laying the foundation for the
prior inconsistent statement.
39. MCCORMICK § 39; WioMOmm § 1018.
40. State v. Barbar, 250 La. 509, 197 So.2d 69 (1967); State v. Reed, 49
La. Ann. 704, 21 So. 732 (1897).
41. MCCORMICK § 39.
42. MCCORMICK § 39; WIOMORE § 1018. See also Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
43. See note 42 supra.
44. See note 42 supra. See also cases listed note 31 supra.
45. See MCCORMICK § 6.
46. MCCORMICK § 20; WIoMORB § 773.
47. Generally one may not impeach his own witness, but where the
party is surprised by the witness' testimony in court or where the witness
proves hostile, the party for whom the witness is testifying may offer
prior inconsistent statements to impeach that witness. According to
McCormick many courts require that the witness' testimony be harmful
and not merely a refusal to speak. MCCORMICK § 38; WIOMORE § 904.
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Even a genuine opportunity to cross examine the witness
against whom a prior inconsistent statement is offered would
seem inadequate in itself fully to protect defendant from possible
misuse of the out of court statement. A prior statement generally
is not made under oath. It is, therefore, possible that a resulting
conviction will be based at least in part on unsworn testimony
which has, of course, no perjury sanction.48 To depend entirely
on cross examination to cure that defect may not be practical.
The defendant would not wish to destroy the credibility of a
witness whose testimony in court proves favorable to him. More-
over, disproving the veracity of the earlier statement prob-
ably would be extremely difficult. These considerations lend
support to advocates of the orthodox position who maintain that
cross examination is not effective unless the opportunity is had
immediately after the statement is made.49
The only court which has faced the problem agreed that the
opportunity for cross examination is not adequate to protect the
defendant from prejudicial use of prior statements. California had
enacted a statute permitting prior inconsistent statements to be
used as substantive evidence. 50 In People v. Johnson5' the Su-
preme Court of California held that statute unconstitutional in
criminal cases because it denied defendant his right of confronta-
tion. The court reasoned that to be effective for the purpose of
confrontation the opportunity for cross examination should be
contemporaneous with the offering of the prior statement.52 Al-
though the Johnson decision seemed practically to foreclose the
use of prior inconsistent statements by the prosecution, subse-
48. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939), cited in
MCCORMICK § 39 n.30.
49. Id. See also People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 599 (1968).
50. Section 1235 of the California Evidence Code provides:
"Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony
at the hearing and is offered in compliance with section 770." CAL. Evw.
CODH § 1235 (West 1967).
Id. § 770 reads: "Unless the interests of justice otherwise require,
extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness that is inconsistent
with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded unless:
"(a) The witness was so examined while testifying as to give an
opportunity to explain or to deny the statement; or
"(b) The witness has not been excused from giving further testimony
in the action."
51. 68 Cal.2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).
52. For a note criticizing the case on this point especially, see Note,
15 WAYNE L. REv. 874 (1969).
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quent decisions have permitted, as has been the traditional rule,
the admission of prior statements into evidence for impeachment
purposes only.53 Thus, California has returned to the common law
rule requiring instructions limiting the use which may be made
of prior inconsistent statements.
The common law position, however, is not without its dif-
ficulties. In light of Bruton the use of limiting instructions in
criminal cases is generally questionable. 4 Instructions seem in-
adequate to remove the possibility that the jury will consider
the assertive value of the prior inconsistent statement. Conse-
quently it is not sensible to depend upon the instructions alone
to protect the defendant's right of confrontation. However, it
would be unfortunate if the confrontation guarantee operated to
to exclude virtually any prior inconsistent statements offered by
the prosecution, for the state would be at the mercy of unscrupu-
lous defendants or defense witnesses. Perhaps to resolve this
dilemma the courts should, in addition to the traditional safe-
guards55 (including limiting instructions), exclude any prior in-
consistent statements which are likely to unfairly surprise or
prejudice the defendant. 56
Other Non-Assertive Uses of Out of Court Statements
In addition to prior inconsistent statements, many other out
of court statements are received for their non-assertive value.
5T
Virtually all such statements are relevant to prove the simple
fact that the words were spoken or the state of mind of the
53. In People v. Pierce, 75 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (1969), the court of appeal
commented: "Unless the prosecution Is to be deprived of the ability to
prove prior inconsistent statements for impeachment . . . the Johnson rule
compels resorting to limiting instructions, however questionable their
efficacy." See also People v. Odom, 456 P.2d 145, 78 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1969);
People v. Alvarez, 73 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1969).
. 54. E.g., Bruton v. United States, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); People v. Aranda,
63 Cal.2d 18, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965); Note, 82 HARV. L. REV.
472 (1968).
55. Note, 82 HARv. L. REV. 472 (1968). This article considers it partic-
ularly important not to permit the prosecution to impeach its own witness
unless his testimony is actually harmful and not a mere refusal to answer.
See McCoRMICK § 20; WIGMORE § 773.
56. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENcE 45 is similarly phrased. It Is interesting
that the California provision held unconstitutional in the Johnson case
seemed to provide for the exclusion of prejudicial evidence even if it were
inconsistent with the witness' testimony in court and otherwise admissible.
See note 44 supra. See also the proposal In Comment, 47 TEXAS L. Rsv. 250
(1969).
57. McCoaMicx §§ 39, 228; WioMoRm §§ 1018, 1770.
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hearer or speaker. 8 An out of court statement which has a non-
assertive relevance is not automatically admissible. The risk of
the statement's misuse by the jury must be balanced against its
non-assertive relevance. Typically where the statement is deemed
too prejudicial, it is labeled hearsay and excluded on that account.59
The defendant's protection against misuse of the statement of-
fered nonassertively is generally somewhat arbitrary. Instruc-
tions limiting the use the jury is to make of the statement should
be given if requested. However, the traditional safeguards which
accompany the use of prior inconsistent statements are not present
where the statement is offered for some other non-assertive pur-
pose, nor is the witness who made the statement generally avail-
able to testify.6 0 Furthermore, the ability to use prior inconsistent
statements tends to protect the prosecution from unscrupulous
defense witnesses, but as a rule statements offered non-assertively
do not serve so compelling a state interest.6 1 Consequently one
may ask whether the confrontation guarantee generally excludes
statements offered nonassertively. Some support for the prop-
osition that confrontation precludes the use of out of court
statements offered nonassertively is found in the harmless error
rule announced in Chapman v. California.62 It is arguable at least
that the harmless error rule represents the general principle that
evidence which may prejudice the criminal defendant cannot be
admitted unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. How-
ever, a result which prohibits the use of virtually all out of court
statements except those encompassed in the traditional exceptions
58. Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 611, 615 (1954). See also MCCORMICK § 228;
WIOMORE § 1790.
59. Comment, 14 LA. L. Rav. 611, 620 (1954).
60. By contrast the very nature of prior inconsistent statements insure
that the witness will be on the stand to testify.
61. The state has a legitimate interest in preventing criminal defendants
from raising spurious defenses and offering fabricated evidence which
cannot be effectively rebutted without hearing out of court statements. In
Commonwealth v. DelValle, 351 Mass. 489, 221 N.E.2d 922 (1966), defendants
had pleaded not guilty to murder and claimed that the alleged victim had
committed suicide. The prosecution offered a witness who testified that
the deceased had said a few days before his death that the defendants
had threatened his life. The testimony was offered to rebut a state of mind
consistent with suicide. Certainly in this instance the state had a vital
interest in using out of court testimony to show the state of mind of the
deceased. Nonetheless, the conviction was reversed because the testimony
did not, in fact, show a state of mind Inconsistent with suicide but formed
part of the state's case in chief. Although the case was not decided on eonsti-
tutional grounds, it is illustrative that the first consideration in admitting
out of court statements nonassertively Is the possibility that they will be
used assertively against the criminal defendant.
62. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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to the hearsay rule, does not seem very practical even in terms
of protecting the criminal defendant. In addition, it is not likely
that the Supreme Court intended in Pointer and the subsequent
confrontation cases to overturn the practice of admitting out of
court statements for their non-assertive relevance. As with prior
inconsistent statements it would probably be impossible to formu-
late a precise test to determine whether an out of court statement
offered nonassertively violates confrontation. Perhaps again we
are left with a rule that requires the court to exclude those state-
ments which are likely to surprise or prejudice the defendant.
Of course, the court should be aware that the dangers to the
defendant are greater than with prior inconsistent statements.
Or an example, in Commonwealth v. McGrath6 3 a police lieuten-
ant was permitted to testify that in the presence of the defen-
dant a witness who was absent from the trial accused defendant
of having said: "Get her to a hospital. I just shot her. '64
Defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon and assault with intent to murder. The Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts overruled the defendant's excep-
tion that the testimony denied him opportunity to confront the
witness because the testimony was offered merely to give mean-
ing to the defendant's subsequent equivocal statements6 5 and not
to prove the truth of the accusation. The analysis seems artificial.
Beyond doubt the accusation removed all ambiguity from the
defendant's equivocal statements. However, it is impossible to
distinguish the non-assertive use for which the statement was
admitted from the assertion itself. It would appear, therefore,
that the danger to defendant that the jury will misuse the
evidence is considerable and constitutes a violation of confronta-
tion.
Limitation of Cross Examination
The confrontation guarantee requires that the criminal de-
fendant have an opportunity to cross examine the witness ef-
63. 351 Mass. 534, 222 N.E.2d 774 (1967).
64. Id. at 537, 222 N.E.2d at 776.
65. Using accusations to remove ambiguity from defendant's subsequent
admissions is very similar to the use of tacit admissions. However, the
latter have been condemned for all practical purposes as a violation of
the fifth amendment privilege against self Incrimination. See note 93 infra.
The right against self incrimination does not necessarily apply where the
defendant speaks but it is not clear what he has said.
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fectively.' The effectiveness of the cross examination may be
affected if the court limits its scope. Alford v. United States,0 T
held that the defendant must be allowed to inquire at least into
the name and address of the witness against him. Recently, in
Smith v. Illinois,as the Supreme Court held that the Alford stan-
dard was binding through the confrontation clause upon the
states. Quoting at length from Alford the Court in Smith said:
"The extent of cross-examination with respect to an ap-
propriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of
the trial court. It may exercise a reasonable judgment in
determining when the subject is exhausted.... But no obliga-
tion is imposed on the court, such as that suggested below,
to protect a witness from being discredited on cross-
examination, short of an attempted invasion of his constitu-
tional protection from self incrimination, properly invoked.
There is a duty to protect him from questions which go
beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to
harass, annoy or humiliate him. . . .But no such case is
presented here. .... 69
Possibly under Smith more detailed standards relating to the
limitation of cross examination could be established by the federal
courts. However, almost every subsequent federal case has upheld
the exercise of judicial discretion in limiting cross examination. 0
The cases make emphatically clear that the defendant does not
have the absolute right to know the identity of the witness on
the stand if the prosecution can demonstrate that revelation of
66. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 407 (1965).
67. 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
68. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
69. Id. at 132-33.
70. Aglus v. United States, 413 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374
(7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Amabile, 395
F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968). But see United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.
1968), holding that the trial court erred in holding that a witness did not
waive his right to self incrimination to questions related to his testimony
on direct. Of course, in the Lyon case the witness, not the judge, restricted
the cross examination.
Of the American jurisdictions Arizona seems the most willing to find
that the trial judge abused his discretion to limit cross examinations.
See also State v. Reynolds, 104 Ariz. 149, 449 P.2d 614 (1969); State v. Taylor,




his true identity would endanger the witness.71 However, the
cases do seem to require that the defendant have an opportunity
to impeach the witness. In every case in which cross examination
was properly limited the record already contained considerable
evidence relating to witness's credibility.72
Of course, the defendant may find that the effectiveness of
his cross examination is impaired where the witness invokes a
privilege not to testify. In virtually every case in the criminal
area the privilege invoked is the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. The first inquiry is whether the privilege has
been validly invoked.73 Where the witness has given testimony on
direct examination he may not invoke the privilege as to matters
related to his testimony on cross.7 4 This means practically that
he may not claim the privilege with respect to those matters
raised by his direct testimony. It has recently been held that a
failure to find waiver of the privilege in such a case amounts to a
denial of confrontation." On the other hand, where the privilege
was claimed as to matters not related to the witness' direct
testimony, the courts have distinguished between invoking the
privilege as to direct matters and collateral matters.70 Where the
privilege was invoked as to collateral matters only the testimony
of the witness on direct was not disturbed."7 If, however, the in-
vocation of the privilege was deemed related to matters on direct
then the proper remedy has been to strike so much of the
witness' direct testimony as could not be tested on cross.78 The
distinction between collateral and direct matters is not very help-
ful. The court in Fountain v. United States79 noted: "[T]he ques-
tion in each case must finally be whether defendant's inability
to make the inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by
depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness's direct
71. Agius v. United States, 413 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1969); United States
V. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d
374 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969).
72. See cases cited note 71 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
74. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); see MCCORMICK § 130;
WtaMORE § 2276.
75. United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968).
76. Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1967); see Mc-
CORMICK § 19; WIOMORE § 1391.
77. See note 76 supra.
78. See note 76 supra.
79. 384 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1967).
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testimony."80 Furthermore, although the court in Fountain did
not express doubt as to the efficacy of striking the testimony, it
is certainly questionable that striking is an effective remedy. In
light of Bruton it appears that defendant is entitled to a new trial
where he cannot adequately test the credibility of the witness on
the stand.
A Nevada case, Walker v. Fogliani,81 raised the intriguing
possibility that the right of confrontation might serve as the
basis of compulsory disclosure or even pretrial discovery of pros-
ecution evidence in favor of the defendant. In Walker the trial
court refused to grant defendant's motion for the production of a
police investigation report. The motion was made immediately
after the investigating officer testified on cross that he had made
such a report. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the refusal
to grant the motion denied defendant the right to impeach by
cross-examination which amounted to a denial of the right of
confrontation. Four years prior to Walker the United States Su-
preme Court in deciding Brady v. Maryland 2 said:
"We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution."8 8
Some courts and commentators interpreted Brady as grant-
ing a broad constitutional right to disclosure of evidence in the
prosecution's possession.8 4 Others viewed the case as merely an
extension of the cases which held that the prosecution could not
deliberately suppress evidence favorable to the accused.s 5 Ap-
parently, however, the case has become the basis for motions
made at the close of state's case to inspect virtually all the
evidence in the hands of the prosecution.8 6 If Walker is given
80. rd. at 628.
81. 83 Nev. 154, 425 P.2d 794 (1967).
82. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
83. Id. at 87.
84. E.g., United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d. Cir.
1964); United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1963);
Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963); Comment, The Prosecutor's
Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136
(1964). See Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 Hast. L.J. 865, 893-99 (1968).
85. E.g., United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAST. L.J. 865, 893-99 (1968).
86. Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D.
87 (1964). Apparently the prosecution at the close of its case must make
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credence then the denial of a Brady motion would certainly
amount to a denial of confrontation. The argument is that with-
out timely disclosure of evidence which possibly can be used to
impeach prosecution witnesses, the opportunity to cross-examine
those witnesses is ineffective. Of course the argument is equally
valid to compel pretrial discovery of the prosecutions evidence as
well. There are, however, a number of cases which squarely hold
that the right of confrontation does not require that the prosecu-
tion produce all witnesses or informers at trial.87 Perhaps these
eases can be distinguished since none of them involved a motion
made before or during trial to disclose evidence. In each the de-
fendant complained only on appeal or habeas corpus that his
right of confrontation had been denied because the informer was
not produced at trial.
Confessions and Admissions
It is clear from Bruton that limiting instructions alone will
not satisfy the confrontation right of a defendant who has not
confessed but who is implicated by his codefendant's confession.
The effectiveness of other remedies short of severance was not
considered in Bruton. Surely "striking" the confession is no more
effective than limiting instructions to the jury. The only alterna-
tive is editing the confession so that it does not incriminate the
defendant who has not confessed. Although the practice of editing
the confession has not itself been held unconstitutional, several
cases have properly reversed convictions on confrontation
grounds where the edited confession either implicitly or directly
implicated the other defendant in the crime.88 For example the
insertion of the work "blank" in defendant Y's confession every
time defendant X was named has been held to violate X's right
of confrontation. 9 Likewise, the use of defendant's separate con-
fessions against each other in a joint trial appears prohibited by
available all evidence in its possession to the defense counsel. However, the
prosecution is still under a duty not to deliberately suppress favorable evi-
dence and in good faith disclose such evidence before trial. See United
States v. Harris, 409 P.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1969); Hensley v. United States, 406
F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert denied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969).
87. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1966); Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.2d 936(D.D.C. 1941); People v. Twiggs, 223 Cal. App.2d 455, 35 Cal. Rptr. 859(1963); State v. James, 76 N.M. 376, 415 P.2d 350 (1966).
88. United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966); United States
ex rel. Hill v. Deegan, 268 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also United
States ex rel. Floyd v. Wilkins, 367 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966).
89. United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).
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Bruton. However, the rule of Bruton has been limited in its
effect by the harmless error doctrine.
In Harrington v. California" the Supreme Court upheld
appellant's conviction even though his right of confrontation ac-
cording to the rule announced in Bruton had been violated be-
cause the evidence against the appellant "was so overwhelming
that we conclude that this violation of Bruton was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt... ."91 Although the majority in Harring-
ton relied on Chapman v. California2 the test actually applied
seemed to be, as the dissent pointed out,93 substantially less oner-
ous to the prosecution than the Chapman rule. 4 Both cases re-
quired that the error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, Chapman seemed to define harmless error as one which
made no contribution to the conviction," whereas Harrington
requires merely that the other evidence against the defendant be
overwhelming. The extent to which Harrington has watered
down the Bruton rule remains to be seen. There is some indica-
tion that its effect may be substantial.9 6
Tacit Admission Rule
Formerly under the tacit admission rule an accusation which
normally would call for a denial, and to which the defendant
made no reply, was admissible to prove the truth of the accusa-
tion.97 At this date it seems clear that the tacit admissions rule
applied to custodial interrogations violates the defendant's privi-
lege against self incrimination.98 In his dissent to Commonwealth
v. CavellO Judge Hoffman claimed that the use of tacit admissions
90. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
91. Id. at 254.
92. See note 68 supra.
93. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969) (dissent).
94. See Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959), decided
nine years prior to Bruton, which held admonitions to a jury that it may
use a confession only against the defendant who made the statements was
an abuse of discretion under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. To the government's argument that there was no prejudice because
of the overwhelming evidence, the court replied: "We cannot . . . substitute
ourselves for the jury .... 263 F.2d at 898.
95. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967).
96. Compare Harrington with the dissent in State v. Hopper, 253 La.
439, 466, 218 So.2d 551, 560 (1969), rehearing denied, Feb. 24, 1969, U.S.
appeal pending.
97. E.g., Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943);
WMoaS § 1271.
98. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); Commonwealth v. Dravecz,
424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904 (1967).
99. 207 Pa. Super. 274, 217 A.2d 824 (1966).
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is prohibited as well by the confrontation clause. Judge Hoffman
claimed that the accusation was admissible to show only those
charges to which the defendant made no reply and not to prove
the truth of the accusation. 10 0 Since the jury could not possibly
distinguish between the assertive and non-assertive use of the
statement the defendant could not cross-examine the witness
against him. Consequently his right of confrontation was violated.
Usually, however, the defendant's silence in the face of an ac-
cusation is treated as if it were an affirmative adoption of the
accusation. 101 Consequently, just as adopted admissions are re-
ceived as if they were the defendant's own words, the accusation
is admissible to prove that it is true.10 2 Thus Judge Hoffman's
reasoning is not supported by most of the authority. Nonethe-
less, it seems that tacit admissions violate the right of con-
frontation. The accusations leveled at the defendant are in no real
sense his own admission, nor is it very sensible to claim that he
has adopted the accusation as his own. It should be recognized
that the rule is highly artificial and, as Wigmore points out,108
exists principally on the basis of ancient precedents. These con-
siderations are not academic for it appears that the privilege
of self incrimination does not at this time apply to statements
made before the defendant is in police custody.10 4 Consequently
the fifth amendment privilege would not prohibit the use of
accusations to which defendant made no reply if the accusations
were made by private individuals while defendant was not in
police custody.
Business Records and Reports of Public Agencies
Most American jurisdictions have long recognized business
records to be an exception to the hearsay rule. 05 A myriad of
statutes provide for the admission of business records and the
records of public officials and agencies into evidence. 0 6 For the
most part the exceptions seem designed for use in civil litiga-
tion but frequently are relied upon for the admission of records
into criminal proceedings. The exceptions are distinct but in
100. Id. at 291, 217 A.2d at 832.
101. See note 97 supra.
102. See note 97 supra.
103. WICMORE § 1271.
104. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
105. MCCORMICK §§ 281-290; WIGMORE § 1517; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
514; UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(13), 63(15).
106. See note 105 supra.
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many respects have been treated much the same, and the con-
frontation problems encountered are identical.
Properly administered the business and public records ex-
ceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay
exceptions as the danger of inaccurate memory or narration on
the part of the witness is virtually removed. 10 7 However, in the
confrontation area the treatment accorded business records and
the like has been anything but uniform.1 0 8 As an unfortunate
example, in one case the defendant's conviction for failing
to report under Selective Service orders for conscientious objec-
tor civilian work was based upon a note to the effect that the
defendant had not reported as ordered. 0 9 The note which
apparently was sent the Selective Service Board by the civilian
employer was not dated or signed and there was no indication
who wrote and mailed it. It seems clear that the defendant had
no opportunity to cross examine the witness against him and
indeed did not even know who the witness was. It is equally
clear that the circumstances surrounding the note do not protect
the defendant's right of confrontation. Perhaps to prevent such
abuse the courts should start with the proposition that as a
general rule confrontation prohibits the use of business or
agency records in criminal trials. However, there are cases in
which the records have very high probative value and should
be used. Certainly, before considering the evidence the Court
107. Generally the reliability guarantee is aimed at insuring the sin-
cerity of the hearsay statement and does not guarantee against defects in
memory, perception, and narration. It seems that business records guard
against weakness in memory and narration and to an extent perception as
well. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HAav. L. REv. 177 (1949); E. MOnGAN, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE-Foreword,
36-50 (1942).
108. E.g., United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 936' (1968) (unsigned and undated note admitted to prove
that defendant failed to report for civilian work under the orders of Selec-
tive Service Board); McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1965)(admission of business records is largely discretionary with the trial court);
Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
825 (1958) (admission of certificate showing alcoholic content in blood sample
did not violate the right to confrontation); Morales v. Superior Court, 49
Cal. Rptr. 173 (1966) (reliance on clerk's reports of tardiness in contempt
proceedings possibly denied contemnor the right to confrontation); People
v. Ziebell, 82 Ill. App. 2d 350, 227 N.E. 127 (1967) (weightmaster's certificate
used In trial for violation of trucking regulation did not violate confronta-
tion); State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 (1967) (document
labelled "Report of Examination for Alleged Rape" was admitted at stat-
utory rape trial, confrontation violated).
109. United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 936 (1968).
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should require a showing that the witness who made the record
is absent and that a good faith effort to procure his attendance
has been made. 110 Then weighing the probable reliability of the
records, their significance in proving the charge against the
defendant, and the seriousness of the charge the evidence could
be admitted at the court's discretion.
Prior Recorded Testimony
Prior recorded testimony is sometimes considered an excep-
tion to the rule against hearsay depending on the definition
of hearsay used."' Traditionally prior recorded testimony has
been treated as not admissible unless there existed substantial
identity of issues and parties at the earlier and later pro-
ceedings." 2 In addition the witness must be unavailable before
his prior testimony can be used. Originally it was required that
the witness actually be deceased before his prior testimony could
be admitted. 1 3 The Pointer decision contained language that
suggested a return to the old position that the witness must
be dead. 11 4 However, Barber v. Page,"5 a 1968 Supreme Court
case, made it clear that the witness need only be unavailable.
Barber did require that the prosecution prove it had made a
good faith diligent effort to obtain the witness before his prior
testimony might be admitted into evidence. Specifically the
Court called for the use of the writ of habeas corpus ad testi-
ficandum where the witness is imprisoned out of the jurisdic-
tion. The Court required that the writ be used even where there
was no statutory basis for it. Furthermore, the prosecution must
resort to the Uniform Act for the Procurement of Witnesses
where enacted. 1 6
In light of Pointer and Barber one might assume that where
110. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); United States v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 225 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
111. According to Wigmore prior testimony Is not an exception because
there has been an opportunity to cross examine the witness. WICMORE § 1370.
However, most courts and commentators apparently treat prior testimony as
an exception to hearsay rule. MCCORMICK § 230.
112. MCCoRMICK §§ 232, 233; WioMOR. § 1370.
113. MCCORMICK § 231.
114. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1964): "This Court has recog-
nized the admissibility against an accused . . . of testimony of a deceased
who has testified at a formal trial."
115. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
116. For a more detailed discussion of the availability requirement and
the Barber decision, see Comment, Confrontation: Prior Testimony, Con-
fessions, and the Sixth Amendment, 36 TENN. L. REv. 382 (1969).
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the defendant was given the opportunity to cross examine the
witness at the preliminary hearing and the witness was genuinely
unavailable for trial, that the use of his prior testimony would
not raise any confrontation problems. Even this assumption
has been challenged by the California case, People v. Gibbs.117
Generally the issues at the preliminary hearing and the sub-
sequent trial will be the same. However, at a preliminary hear-
ing the prosecution merely must show probable cause and need
not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The problem raised
in Gibbs is whether this difference in burden of proof adversely
affects a defendant's right of confrontation where testimony
from the preliminary hearing is used at trial. As a practical
matter, it is easy to understand why defense counsel would be
reluctant to fully cross examine prosecution witnesses at the
preliminary hearing. For one thing he may feel that it would
be useless in view of the burden of proof. Furthermore, he
may be reluctant to show the prosecution his plan of attack
against the state witnesses. Gibbs recognized these problems11
and held that upon its particular facts the use of the prior
testimony even where the defendant strictly speaking had an
opportunity to cross-examine and where the witness was genu-
inely unavailable amounted to a denial of confrontation. The
facts of Gibbs were somewhat extreme. The absent witness was
a police informer, counsel for the defendant was appointed only
five minutes before the preliminary proceeding began, and the
absent witness was the only prosecution witness who could
establish the basic elements of the narcotics charge by observa-
tion. The decision seems very sensible, but it is almost im-
possible to generalize any rule from it. If Gibbs is to be taken
as authority then apparently each case must be decided on its
facts with special consideration to the surprise caused defense
counsel, the relationship of the absent witness to the prosecu-
tion, and the significance of his testimony in establishing the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Interrogatories and Depositions
The use of interrogatories and cross-interrogatories has been
condemned as a violation of the defendant's right of confron-
117. 63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1967).
118. Id. at 475.
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tation.119 This seems clearly correct. Not only is much of the
effect of cross examination lost if the witness has a great length
of time in which to frame his answers but neither the defendant
nor his counsel are present at the taking of the interrogatory.
There is some question as to the use of depositions. 120 If
defendant and his counsel be present at the taking and the
witness were unavailable at trial, under the Barber standards
there would seem no objection to the use of depositions. How-
ever, the possibility of abuse and inconvenience to the defense
counsel and defendant both should be taken into account before
authorizing the taking of the depositions. Finally, the fact that
the jury has not had the opportunity to see the witness and to
be present at the confrontation between the defendant and the
witness may have some bearing on the determination of the
validity of the use of depositions.
Conclusion
In the area of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, the con-
frontation clause makes possible a constitutional standard which
includes but is not limited to the tests of reliability and need.
It is possible that some of the traditional exceptions will be
excluded under confrontation because they are no longer con-
sidered reliable. The reliability of dying declarations for exam-
ple, has been questioned.121 In addition the right to confron-
tation includes an element of active participation with the
witness. This element may work to exclude some out of court
evidence regardless of its reliability. It is certainly possible
that some evidence which has been admitted under a business
records or similar exception may be excluded for this reason.
Where the statement is offered nonassertively there is no
precise test for confrontation. At best, unless all out of court
statements are to be excluded, the courts must balance the
danger that the statement will be used assertively by the jury
against the nonassertive value of the statement. Of course, the
constitutional right of confrontation seems to weigh heavily
in favor of the defendant so that in some cases no matter how
119. United States v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968).
120. The use of depositions has been upheld against a challenge that
they violate defendant's right to confrontation in at least two state cases.
Noe v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1965); Coffman v. State, 81 Nev.
634, 407 P.2d 168 (1965).
121. MCCORMICK § 258; Comment, 75 YALm L.J. 1434 (1966).
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great the nonassertive value of the statement the danger of
misuse requires it to be excluded. Among statements offered
nonassertively, prior inconsistent statements are peculiar. Be-
cause they are clothed with many safeguards including the
opportunity to question the witness on the stand and because
they serve a vital state interest, prior inconsistent statements
are more readily admissible than most other statements offered
nonassertively. Even with prior inconsistent statements it would
appear that any substantial danger of misuse by the jury would
bring the statement within the prohibition of the confrontation
clause.
J. Broocks Greer, III
INCOME TAX EFFECTS ON PERSONAL
INJURY RECOVERIES
In spite of their obvious importance, the income tax effects
on personal injury recoveries have caused considerable confu-
sion for more than fifty years.' In the midst of this confusion the
attorney is called upon to advise his client in such a manner
that the latter can pay the proper tax required of him, if any.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the income tax ef-
fects on personal injury recoveries in four areas. Specifically,
this Comment will examine the successful plaintiff's income tax
liability, the deductibility of defendant's personal injury pay-
ment, income tax as a factor in measuring damages, and instruc-
tions to the jury as to income tax consequences.
Plaintiff's Income Tax Liability
As to income taxability, injury awards are divided into two
classes, personal and non-personal; each is accorded a different
tax treatment. The rule for non-personal compensatory injury
awards is that damages and other recoveries follow the tax
treatment which would have been accorded the underlying
claim.2 Thus, in all non-personal injuries, the question is "[i]n
1. The exemption of personal injury awards from gross income was
first found in the INT. REV. CODE of 1918, § 213(6).
2. This principle was first recognized In Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932). It Is now well established.
See United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936); Durkee v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944); Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Com-
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